Voluntary Departure: Stopping the Clock for Judicial Review by Walsh, Chelsea
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 73 Issue 6 Article 9 
2005 
Voluntary Departure: Stopping the Clock for Judicial Review 
Chelsea Walsh 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Chelsea Walsh, Voluntary Departure: Stopping the Clock for Judicial Review, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 2857 
(2005). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol73/iss6/9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Voluntary Departure: Stopping the Clock for Judicial Review 
Cover Page Footnote 
J.D. Candidate, 2006, Fordham University School of Law. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol73/iss6/9 
VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE: STOPPING THE
CLOCK FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
Chelsea Walsh*
"Deportable aliens should not be faced with the choice between
enjoying voluntary departure privilege and securing judicial review
of Board determinations."1
INTRODUCTION
To escape political persecution at the hands of a violent regime, a
man flees and enters the United States without permission or the
proper documentation. Once in the United States, the man does not
violate any laws and works to send money back to his family in his
native country. Eventually, however, the United States Immigration
and Customs Enforcement discovers his illegal status. The man
appears before an immigration judge and concedes deportability. He
argues, however, that he should be granted asylum due to the ongoing
persecution of members of his political party in his native country. In
the alternative, the man requests a voluntary departure order,
allowing him to leave the country at his own expense, and removing
some of the stigma attached to deportation.
The immigration judge ("IJ") does not grant the man asylum but
grants the request for voluntary departure and orders him to leave the
country within sixty days. The alien, still fearful of returning to his
native country, appeals the IJ's decision to the Board of Immigration
Appeals, which affirms the decision. The man now faces an important
decision. He may either leave the country within the sixty-day period
set by the immigration officials or appeal the decision denying asylum
to a federal circuit court. The outcome of his case will likely hinge on
which circuit court the man appeals to.2
The circuits have split on the issue of whether courts have power to
grant reinstatements or stays of the voluntary departure periods.' As
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, Fordham University School of Law.
1. Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588, 598 (7th Cir. 1991). The Kaczmarczyk
court held, however, that the court lacked the power to grant an extension of the
voluntary departure period due to the language of the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"). Id; see infra Part II.A.2.a.ii.
2. This hypothetical is based on Kaczmarczyk, 933 F.2d at 590-93.
3. See infra Part II.
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is often the case, an alien's departure period may run before a circuit
court has the opportunity to hear the alien's appeal.4 Therefore, in
the circuits that hold that courts do not have the power to reinstate or
stay departure periods, an alien may be forced to choose between
having his appeal heard in a circuit court and enjoying the benefits of
voluntary departure.5 Due to the circuit split, the geographic area in
which an alien resides may impact his decision to apply for and accept
voluntary departure as a relief.6
Part I of this Note traces the development of immigration law in the
United States and clarifies the voluntary departure order process.7
Part II discusses various approaches adopted by the federal circuit
courts of appeals, and the subsequent circuit split that has developed
regarding the circuit courts' power to reinstate departure periods, or
to stay departure periods while the alien's appeal is heard in the
court.8 Part III argues that the U.S. Supreme Court should grant
certiorari to resolve the circuit split. The Court should determine
that, while a circuit court cannot reinstate the departure period as
established by statute, it may use its equitable powers to grant a stay
of the voluntary departure period while hearing an appeal.9
I. IMMIGRATION LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
This part briefly traces the evolution of immigration law in the
United States and then describes the structure by which immigration
determinations have been made, both prior to and after the creation
of the Department of Homeland Security. It also explains the
substantive and procedural aspects of a deportation or removal
proceeding, specifically with regard to the relief of voluntary
departure.
A. Early Development of Immigration Law in the United States
The United States did not enact extensive federal legislation in the
area of immigration law for nearly a century following the nation's
founding,"° and it was unclear whether the Constitution granted the
federal government the power to regulate immigration." Although
Congress did not generally invoke its power to regulate immigration
4. See infra Parts II.B.2, III.B.
5. See infra Parts II.B.2, III.B.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part I.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See David Weissbrodt, Immigration Law and Procedure in a Nutshell 3 (4th
ed. 1998).
11. In 1875, the U.S. Supreme Court held state restrictions on immigration
unconstitutional as infringements on the federal power over foreign commerce. See
Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 270-74 (1875).
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before 1875, it did pass a series of acts regulating naturalization.12
This era of unrestricted immigration led to periods of incredible
population growth for the fledgling nation. 3
As the number of immigrants grew, "[d]iscontent with the open
immigration policy" began to emerge. 4 In response to the large
number of Catholic immigrants, anti-Catholic groups grew and gained
support. 5 In addition, a variety of groups "campaigned for legislation
halting immigration."' 6
The Civil War temporarily halted these groups from pursuing their
anti-immigration policies. 7 However, "[a]fter the Civil War, federal
law began to reflect the growing desire to restrict the immigration of
certain groups, and in 1875 Congress passed the first restrictive
statute."' 8 The Immigration Act of 1875 designated, for the first time,
"certain classes of aliens as excludable," 9 and barred convicts and
prostitutes from admission.20
The Immigration Act of 1882 further excluded "lunatics," "idiots,"
and those likely to become public charges, and imposed a head tax on
every arriving immigrant.21  The Act "mark[ed] the end of the
indecision between state and federal jurisdiction over immigration., 22
In the years following the Immigration Act of 1882, Congress
continued to increase the number of excludable groups, and, by 1907,
federal acts excluded the diseased,2 3 "paupers, 24 "polygamists,"'25 the
12. For example, in 1790, Congress adopted the first act regarding naturalization,
which liberally granted citizenship to free white immigrants and established a
residency requirement of two years. See Act of Mar. 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 103. In 1795,
Congress created a five-year residency requirement for citizenship. See Act of Jan. 29,
1795, 1 Stat. 414. In addition, in 1798, Congress gave the President the authority to
expel dangerous aliens. See Act of July 6, 1798, 1 Stat. 577.
13. Until 1820, no official records were kept on the number of immigrants
entering the United States, but estimations suggest that 250,000 people arrived
between 1790 and 1820, and over ten million people entered the United States
between 1820 and 1880. Weissbrodt, supra note 10, at 5. Due to "economic
devastation" and political pressure, 2.8 million Irish immigrants came to the United
States between 1820 and 1880. Id. Furthermore, during the European depression of
the 1840s, many German Catholics entered the United States. Id.
14. Id.
15. See id.
16. Id. Examples of these groups include "social reformers, Protestant
Evangelicals, the Nativists, the Order of the Star-Spangled Banner, and the Know-
Nothing Party." Id.
17. See id.
18. Id. at 6; see Act of Mar. 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 477.
19. E.P. Hutchinson, Legislative History of American Immigration Policy 1798-
1965, at 66 (1981).
20. See 18 Stat. 477.
21. Id.
22. Hutchinson, supra note 19, at 83.
23. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1084.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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"insane, "beggars, "anarchists, ' 8 the "feeble-minded, 29 those
with tuberculosis,3" and those persons with a "mental or physical
defect... [that] may affect [their] ability.., to earn a living."31
Despite these growing limitations, about 8.8 million immigrants
were admitted to the United States between 1900 and 1910.32 In
addition, the limitations did not quell the influx of "new immigrants"
from areas outside of Northern and Western Europe.33 Similar to the
anti-Catholic sentiment prominent before the Civil War, the
immigration measures of the period preceding World War I were
influenced by "strongly racist and ethnocentric sentiments."34
Historian E.P. Hutchinson explains, "[i]t was a time when beliefs
about race and ethnic superiority or inferiority were common, and
these beliefs come out strongly in the discussion of immigration
questions.""
In response to these growing attitudes, Congress passed the
Immigration Act of February 5, 1917.36 This Act "represents a turning
point in American immigration policy, a definite move from
regulation to attempted restriction through the final passage of the
literacy test. '37 In addition, the Act prohibited the immigration of all
persons from an "Asiatic barred zone defined by latitude and
longitude," marking "an unmistakable declaration of a white
immigration policy."38
Dissatisfied with results of these restrictions, Congress looked to
modify the nation's immigration policies to reduce immigration levels
and to "change the ethnic composition of those permitted entry."39
Therefore, Congress enacted the Immigration Act of May 19, 1921,
the nation's first quota act.40 The Act "set the annual quota for each
nationality group at three percent of the number of foreign-born
26. Act of Mar. 3, 1903, Pub. L. No. 57-162, 32 Stat. 1213.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-96, 34 Stat. 898.
30. Id. at 899.
31. Id.
32. Weissbrodt, supra note 10, at 8.
33. Id.
34. Hutchinson, supra note 19, at 157.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 167; Act of Feb. 5, 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, 39 Stat. 874.
37. Hutchinson, supra note 19, at 167. A bill proposing a literacy test was
introduced in Congress in 1895, and although it passed both houses, President Grover
Cleveland "vetoed it, suggesting that the test was hypocritical." Thomas Alexander
Aleinikoff et al., Immigration: Process and Policy 50 (3d ed. 1995). For the next
twenty-five years, an "active segment of Congress, had been trying to pass such a
test... and had at last succeeded in spite of many blocks in Congress and four
presidential vetoes." Hutchinson, supra note 19, at 167.
38. Hutchinson, supra note 19, at 166-67.
39. Aleinikoff et al., supra note 37, at 53.
40. Act of May 19, 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-5, 42 Stat. 5.
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persons of that national origin enumerated in the 1910 census,
excepting the Asiatic barred zone."41
Congress viewed this Act as a temporary solution to the
immigration problems facing the nation, but extended the Act for
another two years.42 In 1924, Congress passed an act that became
known as the "National Origins Act," 43 and was "heralded as a
permanent solution to U.S. immigration problems." 44 The National
Origins Act further restricted immigration by reducing the
immigration quota to two percent of the 1890 census45 and provided
for the issuance of visas by consular offices abroad.46
In 1929, as provided by the National Origins Act, new quotas
"based on the contribution of each nationality to the overall United
States population rather than on the foreign-born population" took
effect. 47 The population of the United States was still chiefly Anglo-
Saxon; therefore, the national origins quota placed even greater
restrictions on newer immigrant groups.48  Shortly after the
implementation of the national origins formula the Great Depression
began,49 significantly reducing the number of immigrants that came to
the United States.50
The United States' policies most adversely affected those
immigrants attempting to escape Europe before World War II. ' For
example, in 1939, a bill designed to save 20,000 German children from
Nazi Germany failed in Congress because the number of children
would have exceeded the German quota. 2  In 1940, the State
Department did "permit[] consuls outside of Germany to issue visas
to German refugees because the German quota sometimes remained
unfilled. '53 However, "these measures were too few and came too
late to help most of the victims of Nazi persecution.
5 4
Following the war, the extent of the "Nazi atrocities" came to light,
and a "short period of liberalization of the strict quota laws"
41. Hutchinson, supra note 19, at 180.
42. Aleinikoff et al., supra note 37, at 53.
43. Act of May 26, 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153.
44. Aleinikoff et al., supra note 37, at 53.
45. 43 Stat. at 159.
46. Id. at 156-57; see also Aleinikoff et al., supra note 37, at 53.
47. Aleinikoff et al., supra note 37, at 53; 43 Stat. at 153.
48. Weissbrodt, supra note 10, at 12. "The national origins quota allotted 85% of
the total quota of 150,000 [new immigrants] to countries from the North and West of
Europe, while the South and East received only 15% of that total quota." Id.
49. Id.
50. Aleinikoff et al., supra note 37, at 54. "During the 1930s, only 500,000
immigrants came to the United States, less than one-eighth of the number that had
arrived in the previous decade." Id.
51. Id. at 55.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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occurred.5 In 1945, President Harry S. Truman issued a directive
admitting 40,000 war refugees.56 In addition, Congress passed "An
Act To expedite the admission to the United States of alien spouses
and alien minor children of citizen members of the United States
armed forces" in 1945,' 7 which permitted alien spouses and children of
members of the American armed forces to immigrate to the United
States.8
B. Immigration and Nationality Act
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952"9 ("INA")
"consolidated previous immigration laws into one [coordinated]
statute.,6' The INA acted as a "comprehensive codification" and
replaced all earlier immigration laws but has been amended
frequently since its inception.
61
The enabling provision of the INA delegated the authority for
administering the INA and enforcing its provisions to the Attorney
General.62 In addition, the Attorney General was authorized and
"inescapably required-to delegate responsibilities to officers of [the
Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS")] and also to other
officers.., of the Department of Justice., 6
3
Although the INA expressly established the INS, it did not
delineate its powers, but rather left it to the discretion of the Attorney
General.' In addition, "[t]he responsibility of the INS Commissioner
[was] to determine policy and overall management of the agency. The
INS [was] divided into four regions, each of which [was] headed by a
55. Weissbrodt, supra note 10, at 14.
56. Aleinikoff et al., supra note 37, at 55.
57. Act of Dec. 28, 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-271, 59 Stat. 659.
58. Id.
59. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2000).
60. Aleinikoff et al., supra note 37, at 56. As a consolidation of previous laws, the
INA "preserved the national origins quota system." Id.
61. See id. at xiv.
62. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a); see also Aleinikoff et al., supra note 37, at 100-01. Thomas
Aleinikoff and his co-authors note, however, that a tension exists between the dual
tasks of administering the INA and enforcing its provisions. Id. at 101. Administering
a statute "requires the administrators to counsel affected individuals regarding their
possible rights, liabilities and future actions.., and help guide them through the
process." Id. On the other hand, "[e]nforcement of a statute.., might properly call
forth an attitude of tough-mindedness and suspicion on the part of the officials
involved." Id. Therefore, "[b]ecause the INA is both highly complex and notoriously
violated on a broad scale, the tension here becomes particularly acute." Id. For more
information on the administration and enforcement of the INA, see Edwin Harwood,
In Liberty's Shadow: Illegal Aliens and Immigration Law Enforcement 25-48, 168-92
(1986).
63. Aleinikoff et al., supra note 37, at 101; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1103. The structure
of the enforcement of immigration law in the United States has changed since the
creation of the Department of Homeland Security. See Part I.C. for more information
on these changes.
64. Aleinikoff et al., supra note 37, at 101-02.
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regional commissioner., 65  A principle function of the INS was the
adjudication of "applications for various benefits available under the
immigration laws., 66 In each case, a citizen or alien applied to the INS
for a benefit, and the INS officer who reviewed the petition or request
had to decide whether the application was "complete and bona fide,"
and "whether it me[t] the requirements set forth in the statute and the
regulations.
67
The Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR") is
separate from the INS, but also under the purview of the Department
of Justice. The EIOR consists of the IJ and the Board of Immigration
Appeals ("BIA").68 The majority of the IJs' time is spent deciding
questions of excludability and deportability.69 However, the IJs also
"conduct proceedings ... to rescind an admitted immigrant's
adjustment of status. .. , and they may hear challenges brought by
aliens ordered not to leave the country under the departure control
provisions. '"70 The BIA acts as the "administrative appellate body for
cases under the immigration laws."71
C. Current Structure of Implementing Immigration Laws
With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security,72 the
structure implementing immigration law in this country has
significantly changed. "[T]he responsibility for providing
immigration-related services and benefits" was "transferred from" the
65. Richard A. Boswell, Immigration and Nationality Law 7 (1992).
66. Aleinikoff et al., supra note 37, at 103. Examples of this function include
determining whether to grant extensions for tourists, handling applications for
adjustments of status that occur when a nonimmigrant marries a citizen and settles in
the U.S., and determining whether to grant a visa petition filed by a citizen on behalf
of a noncitizen family member living in another country. Id.
67. Id. at 104.
68. See 6 U.S.C. § 521(a) (2000); see also Boswell, supra note 65, at 7. The
Executive Office of Immigration Review ("EOIR") was separated from the
Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") by the Attorney General in January
1983. See Aleinikoff et al., supra note 37, at 110. Criticism by attorneys and the
immigration judges, who opposed the pressures put on them by the INS, led to this
separation. Boswell, supra note 65, at 7 n.5.
69. Boswell, supra note 65, at 7. Under the Act, proceedings to remove aliens
must be conducted by an immigration judge, who is designated by the Attorney
General to fulfill this role. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2000) (definitions), § 1225
(inspection), §§ 1226, 1252 (removal proceedings).
70. Aleinikoff et al., supra note 37, at 110; see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.
71. Boswell, supra note 65, at 7.
72. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress passed the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, which created the Department of Homeland Security.
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (to be codified in
scattered sections of 6 U.S.C.) . The mission of the Department of Homeland
Security is to "(A) prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; (B) reduce the
vulnerability of the United States to terrorism; (C) minimize the damage, and assist in
the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do occur within the United States." Id. §
101(b), 116 Stat. at 2142.
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INS to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
("USCIS"), under the Department of Homeland Security, on March
1, 2003.7  The USCIS is "responsible for the administration of
immigration and naturalization adjudication functions and
establishing immigration services policies and priorities. ' 74  These
functions include the adjudications of "immigrant visa petitions,"
"naturalization petitions," "asylum and refugee applications," and
"[a]ll other adjudications performed by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service. 75
Furthermore, the United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement ("ICE") assumed responsibility for the investigation and
enforcement of United States immigration laws.76 Additionally, the
United States Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") is now
responsible for managing and securing the nation's borders. 7  The
EOIR, including the IJs and the BIA, however, remains in the
Department of Justice under the Attorney General, thus maintaining
the separation of the judicial role of immigration courts from the
enforcement functions now residing in ICE.7s
D. Process of Deportation Determinations
Under both the new and the old structure of immigration
enforcement, Js have the power to make determinations regarding
deportation.79 Deportation is "the removal of an alien who has
entered the United States-either legally or illegally."8
1. Substantive and Procedural Aspects of Deportation
Congress has established a list of grounds for deportation and has
codified procedures for deportation proceedings.
a. Substantive Aspects of Deportation
The Supreme Court "has established essentially no limits on
Congress' authority" to define the substantive aspects of
73. See U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Immigration & Borders: Serving Our
Visitors, Securing Our Borders, at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/theme-home4.jsp
(last visited Feb. 10, 2005).
74. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., About US, at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/aboutus/index.htm (last visited March 15, 2005).
75. U.S. Department of Homeland Security Act § 451, 116 Stat. at 2195.
76. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., supra note 73.
77. Id.
78. See Executive Office of Immigration Review, United States Dep't of Justice,
Background Information, at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/background.htm. (last visited
Mar. 25, 2005).
79. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2000).
80. Aleinikoff et al., supra note 37, at 511.
[Vol. 732864
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deportation.81 Upholding the constitutionality of the deportation of
prostitutes under the 1907 Act, Justice Holmes wrote:
It is thoroughly established that Congress has power to order the
deportation of aliens whose presence in the country it deems hurtful.
The determination by facts that might constitute a crime under local
law is not a conviction of crime, nor is the deportation a punishment;
it is simply a refusal by the Government to harbor persons whom it
does not want.82
The grounds for deportation are a "historical collection of traits and
acts that... Congress[] over the past century ha[s] deemed
undesirable."83
81. Id. at 512. The deference to Congress is not limited simply to the area of
deportation. In general, the history of immigration law in the U.S. has largely been
dominated by the plenary powers doctrine, which provides for an "extremely
deferential standard that courts will apply in considering the constitutionality of
government conduct in this area." Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress
Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of Immigration Proceedings, 29 Conn. L. Rev.
1411, 1413 n.6 (1997); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, A Framework for Analyzing the
Constitutionality of Restrictions on Federal Court Jurisdiction in Immigration Cases, 29
U. Mem. L. Rev. 295, 299 (1999); Sonia Chen, The Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996: Another Congressional Hurdle for the Courts, 8
Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 169, 169 (2000).
82. Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913).
83. Aleinikoff et al., supra note 37, at 535. For example, the statute makes
deportable all aliens who were "excludable at time of entry," which allows the
government to expel aliens who entered the country without permission. Id. at 537;
see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1). These provisions cover "illegal" aliens who enter the U.S.
by evading inspection and those nonimmigrants who stayed beyond the time
authorized at their admissions. Id. § 1227(a)(1). In addition, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)
makes the commission of certain crimes deportable. These include "crimes of moral
turpitude," for which an alien may be deported if he is convicted of such a crime
within five years, or ten years if granted lawful permanent residence status, of
admission to the country, or convicted of a crime in which the punishment is a year or
more of incarceration. Id. § 1227(a)(2). Black's Law Dictionary defines "crimes of
moral turpitude" as "act[s] of baseless, vileness, or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man." Black's Law
Dictionary 1160 (rev. 4th ed. 1957). In addition, an alien who is convicted of two or
more crimes of moral turpitude is deportable regardless of when after admission they
took place. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). Also, an "alien who is convicted of an
aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable." Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
Furthermore, any alien convicted of an offense involving any controlled substance, or
who admits to being a drug addict or abuser is deportable. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(b)(i)-(ii).
Other deportable crimes enumerated in the statute include: firearm offenses, treason,
espionage, sabotage, crimes of domestic violence, stalking, and crimes against
children. Id. § 1227(a)(2). Aliens who commit security violations, including terrorist
activities, or activities in the United States that the Secretary of State has reasonable
grounds to believe would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy
consequences for the United States, may also be deported. Id. § 1227(4)(A)-(C).
Aliens may also be deported for becoming public charges within five years of entry,
id. § 1227(5), and for engaging in unlawful voting, id. § 1227(6).
2005] 2865
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b. Deportation Procedure
The filing of a notice to appear begins the removal process.' 4 The
notice to appear informs the alien of "the nature of the proceedings,"
the factual allegations underlying the charge of deportability, and the
"statutory provisions alleged to have been violated."85 The IJ decides
whether the alien is deportable and, if so, whether he is eligible for a
discretionary relief measure.86 The IJ is bound by a substantial
evidence standard at the hearing.87 If the alien is found deportable,
the final order may then be appealed to the BIA.88 Upon a
determination of the BIA, the case may be appealed to a federal
court.8 9
2. Relief from Deportation
Even if an IJ finds an alien to be deportable, or an alien "concede[s]
deportability at the outset of the hearing," various provisions of the
INA may grant relief from deportation.9" Lasting relief measures may
be available to nonimmigrants from certain geographic regions
through country-specific measures such as the Nicaraguan Adjustment
and Central American Relief Act ("NACARA").91 In addition, other
84. 8 C.F.R. § 239.1 (2004).
85. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1). The statute lists the specific requirements for a
notice to appear: a statement of the nature of the proceeding; the legal authority
under which the proceeding is conducted; a concise statement of the factual
allegations informing the alien of the "act[] or conduct alleged to be in violation of the
law," and a designation of the "charges against the alien" and "of the statutory
provisions alleged to have been violated." Id. In addition, the notice to appear must
list the time and place of the hearing. Id.
86. Id. The INA authorizes the immigration judge to "conduct proceedings for
deciding the inadmissibility or deportability of an alien," and "administer oaths,
receive evidence, and interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien and any
witnesses," and "decide whether an alien is removable from the United States." Id. §
1229a(a)-(c).
87. Boswell, supra note 65, at 119.
88. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b). The BIA has appellate jurisdiction over decisions
"in exclusion cases," "in deportation cases," "in removal proceedings," concerning
discretionary relief, "involving administrative fines," "relating to bond, or parole, or
detention of an alien," involving "recission of an adjustment of status," "in asylum
proceedings," and "relating to Temporary Protected Status." Id.
89. United States Department of Justice, Board of Immigration Appeals, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2005).
90. Aleinikoff et al., supra note 37, at 640.
91. On November 19, 1997, Congress enacted the Nicaraguan Adjustment and
Central American Relief Act ("NACARA"), Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2160
(1997) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000)). Congress passed NACARA
to help refugees of the Nicaraguan civil war and the fall of communism. NACARA
provides that eligible Nicaraguans or Cubans can apply for adjustment of status to
that of permanent resident aliens. In addition, under NACARA, nationals of El
Salvador, Guatemala, the former Soviet Union, and certain Eastern European
countries, who entered the United States on or before specifically stated dates, are
eligible to apply for suspension of deportation or special cancellation of removal
2005] VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE 2867
lasting relief measures apply to aliens who fulfill certain statutory
requirements, regardless of their country of origin.92
In addition, an alien seeking to avoid deportation based on a
concern for his or her safety in the destination country may apply for
an application for the withholding of removal93 or asylum."
Withholding of removal requires proof of a clear probability that the
"alien's life or freedom would be threatened in that country because
of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion."95 If the alien meets the burden of
proof, relief is automatically granted without any exercise of the
Attorney General's discretion.96
On the other hand, the decision to grant asylum is within the
discretion of the Attorney General.97 To be eligible for asylum, an
alien must prove that he is a "refugee."98 An applicant for asylum
"may qualify as a refugee either because he or she has suffered past
persecution or because he has a well-founded fear of future
persecution."99 In both situations, the applicant bears the burden of
proving eligibility for asylum.00
under more lenient deportation standards. See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Servs., Immigration Through the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American
Relief Act (NACARA) Section 203, at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/residency/nacara203-main.htm (last visited Mar. 12,
2005).
92. Lasting relief measures include the cancellation of removal, by granting the
Attorney General the power to authorize a cancellation of removal relief in favor of
an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States when, among other
circumstances, the alien "establishes that removal would result in exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship to the alien's spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of
the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence." 8 U.S.C. §
1229b(b)(1)(D). Another lasting relief is the adjustment of status from a
nonimmigrant to a permanent resident, which allows the Attorney General to adjust
the status of a nonimmigrant to permanent residence if "(1) the alien makes an
application for such adjustment, (2) the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa
and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence, and (3) an immigrant
visa is immediately available to him at the time his application is filed." Id. § 1255(a).
This Note focuses on cases involving alien petitions for asylum; thus, the information
that follows relates solely to the permanent relief of asylum.
93. See id. § 1231(b)(3)(A).
94. See id. § 1158.
95. Id. § 1231(b).
96. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423 (1987).
97. Id. at 427-28.
98. Id. at 423. A refugee is any person who is "unable or unwilling to return to,
and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, [the home]
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
99. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (2004).
100. Id. § 208.13(a).
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E. Voluntary Departure
If an alien is unable to prove eligibility for permanent relief, he will
often, in the alternative, request a voluntary departure order.' Prior
to the commencement or completion of a hearing on the alien's
deportability, an alien may be permitted to voluntarily depart from
the United States at the alien's own expense. 10 2 At the conclusion of
the hearing, an IJ may enter an order granting voluntary departure if
the alien has been present in the United States for at least one year,
has been a person of good moral character for at least five years, is not
deportable due to a conviction of an aggravated felony or terrorist
activity, and has the means to depart from the United States.0 3 The
district director has the sole authority to extend the voluntarily
departure period as specified initially by an IJ or the BIA. °4
"For the government, voluntary departure expedites and reduces
the cost of removal."'0 5 In addition, the relief of voluntary departure
is an important benefit to a deportable alien because he avoids the
stigma of deportation, is able to select his own destination, and can
leave the United States at his own expense without being subject to
the penalties and restrictions that deportation imposes.0 6
1. Requirements of Voluntary Departure
An alien seeking the relief of voluntary departure under 8 U.S.C. §
1229c has the burden of showing that he meets the eligibility
101. Aleinikoff et al., supra note 37, at 640.
102. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1).
103. Id. § 1229c.
104. 8 C.F.R. § 244.2.
105. Lopez-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 650, 651 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Rife v.
Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 2004)). "The willingness of hundreds of
thousands of aliens to waive a deportation hearing and leave the United States before
a date certainly saves the government untold enforcement resources," and "it is a
virtual certainty that the immigration system in this country would break down if all
aliens who were apprehended as deportable were to request the deportation hearing
the INA provides them." Aleinikoff et al., supra note 37, at 641.
106. See Lopez-Chavez, 383 F.3d at 651; Ramsay v. INS, 14 F.3d 206, 211 n.7 (4th
Cir. 1994). Along with these statutory incentives to voluntary departure, Aleinikoff
and his co-authors note that the decision to choose voluntary departure as an
alternative to deportation proceedings may be influenced by the "inability (or
unwillingness) of the United States government to stop the surreptitious entry of
aliens across the border. The vast majority of aliens granted voluntary departure are
arrested for entering [the U.S.] without inspection and most have no colorable claim
of lawful residence." Aleinikoff et al., supra note 37, at 642. Therefore, "[m]any of
these aliens would rather accept the government's offer of a ride over the border than
stay and fight deportation" because "their chances of effecting another surreptitious
entry are far greater than successfully contesting deportability in a hearing." Id. Thus,
they reason that "[t]he availability of voluntary departure, coupled with the realities
of law enforcement and the rational decisions of aliens, creates a sequence at the
border that is repeated over and over again: unlawful entry, apprehension, detention,
return, and another unlawful entry." Id.
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requirements for such relief prescribed by the statute.107 To prove
that the alien has the means to depart voluntarily, the alien must
prove that he will be able to depart within a reasonable period of
time."8 In addition, courts have broadly interpreted the requirement
of "good moral character" to include various activities that are either
illegal or immoral." 9
2. Punishment for Not Departing Within the Departure Period
If an alien is granted voluntary departure and does not depart
voluntarily by the deadline set by the IJ or BIA, he may be subject to
penalties as set forth in the INA as amended by the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
("IIRIRA").10 First, IIRIRA requires that an alien who is granted
voluntary departure post a departure bond to be forfeited if the alien
fails to depart voluntarily by the end of the departure period."' In
addition, IIRIRA provides that an alien who fails to depart shall be
subject to fine ranging from $1000 to $5000.112 Also, the alien may be
ineligible for a period of ten years for any further relief of voluntary
departure,"' or any relief under the sections of the statute granting an
adjustment of status from nonimmigrant to permanent resident," 4 an
adjustment of status from any nonimmigrant designation to any other
107. See, e.g., Hibbert v. INS, 554 F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1977); Aalund v. Marshall,
461 F.2d 710, 711-13 (5th Cir. 1972); Shkukani v. INS, 435 F.2d 1378, 1380 (8th Cir.
1971); United States ex rel. Ciannamea v. Neelly, 202 F.2d 289, 292 (7th Cir. 1953).
108. In re F 9 I. & N. Dec. 333 (1961).
109. For example, it has been expressly held that the requirement of "good moral
character" is not met by an alien (1) who is a habitual drunkard, Ruiz v. INS, 410 F.2d
382, 383 (6th Cir. 1969); (2) who has committed adultery, Brea-Garcia v. INS, 531
F.2d 693, 694 (3d Cir. 1976); (3) who has knowingly and for gain aided or abetted
another alien to enter the United States illegally, In re Valencia-Barajas, 13 I. & N.
Dec. 369 (1969); (4) who has given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining
benefits under the INA, In re Namio, 14 I. & N. Dec. 412 (1973); In re 0 7 I. & N.
Dec. 486 (1957); (5) who has been confined in a penal institution for an aggregate
period of not less than 180 days following his conviction of a criminal offense, Ruiz,
410 F.2d at 382-83; In re Gantus-Bobadilla, 13 I. & N. Dec. 777, 780 (1971); In re B, 7
I. & N. Dec. 405, 406 (1957); (6) who has engaged in prostitution prior to entry to the
United States, In re G, 5 I. & N. Dec. 559 (1953); (7) who has been convicted of
murder, Ruiz, 410 F.2d at 382; In re Awaijane, 14 I. & N. Dec. 117 (1972); or, (8) who
has been convicted of two petty offenses involving moral turpitude, Khalaf v. INS, 361
F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1966). However, it has been held that an alien who has been
convicted of a single petty offense involving moral turpitude is not precluded from
establishing good moral character, and thus can be found eligible for the relief of
voluntary departure. See In re Urpi-Sancho, 13 I. & N. Dec. 641 (1970).
110. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 240B(d), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-597 (relevant portions codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.).
111. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(3) (2000).
112. Id. § 1229c(d).
113. Id.
114. Id. §§ 1255, 1259.
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nonimmigrant designation,115 and the cancellation of removal.116 The
Act further explains that the order permitting the alien to depart
voluntarily shall inform the alien of the penalties he will incur if he
does not depart.'1 7
3. Appeal
Courts are expressly denied the jurisdiction to hear an appeal from
a denial of a request for voluntary departure and are denied any
power to stay an alien's removal while considering any claim involving
voluntary departure. 18 However, an alien who is granted voluntary
departure after being found removable and denied asylum by the BIA
may appeal the decision regarding removability and asylum to a
circuit court of appeals.119 Often, however, in these situations an
alien's departure period may end before the court completes its
review of the alien's underlying claim application.1 20 In these cases,
the court must address the issue of whether it has the authority to
reinstate or stay a voluntary departure order pending its review of the
BIA determinations.
4. Circuit Split on the Authority of the Federal Courts to Reinstate or
Stay Departure Periods
The circuit courts are presently divided over whether they have
authority to reinstate the departure period following judicial review,
or stay the departure period pending judicial review.121 The majority
of the courts have held that courts lack authority to reinstate
departure periods after completion of judicial review, due to
IIRIRA's changes to immigration law.122 However, the majority of
courts have held that the enactment of JIRIRA does not affect their
equitable powers, and thus courts retain the authority to stay the
departure period pending judicial review. 23
II. THE EMERGENCE OF A CIRCUIT SPLIT
This part describes the conflict that has emerged among the circuit
courts that have examined the power of federal courts either to
115. Id. § 1258.
116. Id. § 1229b.
117. Id. § 1229c(d).
118. Id. § 1229c(f). The statute states: "No court shall have jurisdiction over an
appeal from denial of a request for an order of voluntary departure under subsection
(b) of this section, nor shall any court order a stay of an alien's removal pending
consideration of any claim with respect to voluntary departure." Id.
119. See Aleinikoff et al., supra note 37, at 933.
120. See Zazueta-Carrillo v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 1166, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 2003).
121. See infra Part II.
122. See infra Part II.A.
123. See infra Part II.B.
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reinstate or stay voluntary departure periods. Part II.A discusses the
power of the courts to reinstate departure periods. Specifically, Part
II.A examines IIRIRA's effect on the analysis of the courts. Part II.B
examines the courts' analyses of judicial power to grant stays of
voluntary departure pending judicial review, and traces the majority
of courts' willingness to grant themselves this authority as an aspect of
their equitable powers.
A. Reinstatement of Departure Periods
The circuit courts have divided on the issue of whether they have
the power to reinstate the voluntary departure period pending the
completion of the judicial review of the BIA determinations.
Reinstatement allows the courts to restart the departure period upon
the completion of judicial review.
1. Federal Courts Holding that They Have the Power to Reinstate
Departure Periods
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First and Fourth Circuits have
held that federal circuit courts may reinstate the voluntary departure
period upon the completion of judicial review in certain
circumstances. 24 However, both circuits examined this issue prior to
the passage of IIRIRA.
a. First Circuit
In Umanzor-Alvarado v. INS,"z Florentin Umanzor-Alvarado, a
native of El Salvador, sought asylum.1 26 He argued that the Attorney
General could permit him to stay in the United States since Umanzor
proved that he had "a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
[his] ... political opinion. '' 127 After de novo review of the record of
Umanzor's immigration hearing, the BIA decided that he had not
shown that "'a reasonable person in his circumstances would fear
persecution' because of his political opinion. ' 128 Therefore, the BIA
held that Umanzor's request fell outside of the scope of the Attorney
General's discretionary powers and denied his request for asylum.
1 29
Umanzor appealed this decision to the First Circuit.13 ° The circuit
court denied the petition for review, holding that the BIA "could
lawfully find, as a matter of fact, that Umanzor... did not show a
124. See Ramsay v. INS, 14 F.3d 206, 213 (4th Cir. 1994); Umanzor-Alvarado v.
INS, 896 F.2d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 1990).
125. 896 F.2d at 14.
126. Id. at 15.
127. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2000)).
128. Id. (quoting Guevara-Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir. 1986)).
129. Id.
130. Id.
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'well-founded fear' of such persecution within the terms of 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42)(A)."'' The court reasoned that the BIA "could find that
petitioner had failed to show that such persecution was 'more likely
than not,' and thus he fell outside the scope of 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)
mandating withholding of deportation.
132
Umanzor requested, however, in the event of a denial of his petition
for review, that the circuit court reinstate the period of voluntary
departure that the BIA had granted him. 133  The INS opposed the
request, arguing that its regulations required Umanzor to "ask the
district director for any extension of a grant of voluntary
departure.' 1 34
The court, however, directed the government to "treat the
voluntary departure period as beginning to run on the date this court's
mandate becomes effective."' 35 The court noted that, although the
petitioner's appeal was ultimately unsuccessful, it "was neither
obviously meritless nor apparently interposed solely for purposes of
delay." '136
In addition, the court explained that circuit courts "have either held
or strongly suggested that the law would forbid the government to
deny a reinstatement solely because an alien brought such a good
faith... appeal."'37 Furthermore, the government did not suggest that
it would present the district director with any reason for refusing
reinstatement. 3 8 The court reasoned that to require the petitioner to
apply to the district director for a reinstatement of the departure
period would be "pointless, for the director could not lawfully refuse
the reinstatement." '139 The court held that it had the power to grant
the extension of the voluntary departure period. 140
b. Fourth Circuit
Similarly, in Ramsay v. INS,4 1 the Fourth Circuit held that the
period of voluntary departure should be reinstated.1 42 In Ramsay, Dr.
131. Id. at 16.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 244.2 (2004); Farzad v. INS, 808 F.2d 1071, 1072 (5th Cir.
1987)).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. (citing Contreras-Aragon v. INS, 852 F.2d 1088, 1093-95 (9th Cir. 1988)).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. Even with the passage of IIRIRA, the First Circuit's opinion in Umanzor-
Alvarado is still good law. In Khalil v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 176 (1st Cir. 2004), the court
explained that the departure period runs from the date of the court's mandate, as
decided in Umanzor-Alvarado, and the court noted that it had not revisited that issue
since it decided Umanzor-Alvarado. Id. at 180 n.5.
141. 14 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 1994).
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Graham Ramsay petitioned the Fourth Circuit for review of the
decision by the BIA, which found that he was subject to deportation
because he entered the United States without inspection, but which
granted him the relief of voluntary departure.'43 In the alternative,
Ramsay argued that should his petition for review be denied, the
court should reinstate the voluntary departure period."4 The court
denied his request for review as barred by the doctrine of collateral
estoppel, but held that the period of voluntary departure should be
reinstated.'45
Similar to the argument raised by the government in Umanzar-
Alvarado,'46 the government in Ramsay argued that only the district
director of the INS has the power to grant or extend voluntary
departures.'47 In addition, the government argued that because the
"decision to grant or extend voluntary departure requires several
factual findings which a court of appeals is not suited to make," the
court should "refrain" from reinstating the voluntary departure
period.48
The court agreed that the decision to grant voluntary departure
involved several findings of fact that a court of appeals lacked the
ability to make.'49 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit declined to follow
the approach, which had been adopted by the Ninth Circuit, that
"affirming the deportation order necessarily encompassed the
reinstatement of the voluntary departure."'5 ° Rather, the court in
Ramsay held that the
142. Id. at 213. The Fourth Circuit, however, has recently applied a different
standard in light of the changes brought forth by IIRIRA. See Ngarurih v. Ashcroft,
371 F.3d 182 (2004). In Ngarurih, the court held that a court of appeals lacks the
jurisdiction to entertain requests to reinstate voluntary departure. Id. at 193.
However, the court noted in Ngarurih, that "Ramsay remains applicable to cases not
governed by IIRIRA's permanent rules, i.e., cases in which removal proceedings were
commenced before April 1, 1997." Id. at n.10; see also infra Part II.B.1.
143. Ramsay, 14 F.3d at 208.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 211, 214.
146. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
147. Ramsay, 14 F.3d at 211.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 212.
150. Id. The Ninth Circuit, in Contreras-Aragon v. INS, reasoned that
[t]he result of the deportation hearing, including the discretionary
determinations, is one final order of deportation reviewable by the courts of
appeals.... It is clear that a determination concerning voluntary departure
is one of those determinations made during the deportation hearing that
form a part of the final order of deportation.
Contreras-Aragon v. INS, 852 F.2d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted). However, the Ninth Circuit has since held that Contreras-Aragon
has been superceded by IIRIRA and is thus no longer controlling. See, e.g., Desta v.
Ashcroft, 365 F.3d 741, 746 (9th Cir. 2004); Ordonez v. INS, 345 F.3d 777, 784 n.3 (9th
Cir. 2003); Zazueta-Carrillo v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 2003); see also
infra Part II.A.2.b.i.
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court of appeals should reinstate a voluntary departure granted by
the BIA only when: (1) the INS is wielding its discretion to withhold
voluntary departure to deter applicants from seeking judicial review
of BIA decisions, or (2) the [INS] does not suggest it will present
the district director with any other reason for refusing the
reinstatement. ,51
The court held that it would reinstate Ramsay's period of voluntary
departure because there was no evidence that the conditions which
allowed Ramsay to receive the order of voluntary departure had
changed, and the INS had not presented any other basis for refusing
the reinstatement. 5 2 Therefore, the court reasoned that the district
director "could not lawfully refuse [Ramsay's] reinstatement." '153
2. Federal Courts Holding that They Lack the Authority to Reinstate
Departure Periods
The majority of the circuits, however, have held that courts lack the
authority to reinstate departure periods after judicial review.
a. Decisions Pre-IIRIRA
Prior to the passage of IIRIRA, in contrast to the position adopted
by the First and Fourth Circuits,'54 the Seventh,'55 Tenth,'5 6 and
Eleventh'57 Circuits held that courts lacked the authority to reinstate
departure periods.
i. Tenth Circuit
In Castaneda v. INS,'58 the Tenth Circuit held that it lacked the
authority to review a request for reinstatement of a voluntary
departure order, stating that "none of the pertinent statutes...
provide any basis whatsoever for this court to assume authority for
affording the discretionary, administrative relief sought by
petitioner."'59 The court explained as follows:
[F]ederal courts are tribunals of limited jurisdiction with only those
powers conferred by Congress. Thus, while the heart of judicial
authority is article III of the Constitution, the lifeblood of the
[federal] court[s] is the contents of the Judicial Code. If an act can
be performed by a [federal] court, it is because it was permitted and
151. Ramsay, 14 F.3d at 213 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
152. Id.
153. Id. (quotation omitted).
154. See supra Part II.A.l.
155. See Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1991).
156. See Castaneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576 (10th Cir. 1994).
157. See Nkacoang v. INS, 83 F.3d 353 (11th Cir. 1996).
158. 23 F.3d at 1576.
159. Id. at 1580.
2874 [Vol. 73
VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE
not because it was not prohibited by Congress. Federal courts
operate only in the presence rather than the absence of statutory
authority. 16°
Thus, in contrast to the First and Fourth Circuits, which find
"'nothing in the law ... that deprives [courts] of the legal power to
order the legally appropriate remedy [of voluntary departure],' 161 the
Tenth Circuit explained that this "negative observation" does not
mean that the courts are "affirmatively empowered to act." 162 Rather,
the court argued that Congress must take some sort of "positive step"
in order to grant the courts "jurisdictional authority. 163
In addition, the court addressed the concern that the usual thirty-
day departure period runs out well before the court has the
opportunity to decide the petition for review, thereby making
voluntary departure "conditioned on a waiver of judicial review with
respect to the underlying deportation order."' "6 Therefore, an alien
may choose to voluntarily depart, and give up any opportunity to
overturn the deportation order, or dispute the order and lose benefits
of voluntary departure. 65
The court, however, explained that the alien does not "lose"
anything when given the ability to depart voluntarily. 166 The court
stated that the alien still maintains a right to judicial review but that
"his alternative to continued litigation has been made more
attractive., 167  The court compared this to "enticements offered to
criminal defendants" in plea bargains.'68 In addition, the court noted
that "nothing prevents an alien who pursues judicial review from
subsequently seeking an additional voluntary departure period from
the district director," whose decision is subject to the review of the
district court.
169
Furthermore, the court explained that "[sleveral important
considerations undermine the facial appeal of [the] practical
approach"'70 offered by the First and Fourth Circuits. The court
noted that the solution offered by the Fourth Circuit reflected a
"misplacement of the burden of persuasion."' 71 The court explained
160. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Wyeth Lab. v. United States Dist. Court,
851 F.2d 321, 324 (10th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted)).
161. Id. at 1583 (second alteration in original) (quoting Ramsay v. INS, 14 F.3d 206,
212 (4th Cir. 1994)).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1581.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1582.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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that an alien has the burden of proving that he is both eligible for the
relief and that the relief is warranted. 172 However, the approach
adopted by the Fourth Circuit forces the INS to disprove the
suitability of voluntary departure. 73
In addition, the Tenth Circuit noted that the approach also "reflects
a fundamental misapprehension of the nature of discretionary
authority... [in] conclud[ing] that because the Board once granted
voluntary departure, the district director could not lawfully refuse the
reinstatement [thereof].' ' 174  The court explained that "[t]he very
concept of discretion presupposes a zone of choice within which the
[decision maker] may go either way."'75 Therefore, the court declared
that the Fourth Circuit incorrectly assumed that the BIA and district
director would necessarily have to reach the same conclusion in
exercising their respective discretionary powers. 176 On the contrary,
the Tenth Circuit explained that "in many cases" the BIA and the
district director "could reach different conclusions regarding the
exercise of their respective discretionary authority without any
indication of impropriety.' 1 77
ii. Seventh Circuit
Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 178 involved another example of an appeal of a
BIA asylum determination. The petitioners in the case were Polish
citizens whose asylum applications alleged that they were part of an
organization opposed to the communist government then ruling
Poland.179 All of the petitioners testified that they had been either
imprisoned or arrested by the government while in Poland, and that
the government still sought information about their location. 8 0 The
BIA affirmed the IJ's denial of the asylum applications and granted
them voluntary departure.8
The petitioners argued that the circuit court's review of BIA asylum
decisions "necessarily include[d] the power to extend a grant of
voluntary departure so that the period begins on the date when this
court's decision becomes effective."' 82  In addition, the petitioners
"contend[ed] that the refusal to suspend the running of the period of
voluntary departure pending judicial review of Board decisions will
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. Id. (fourth alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).
175. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Kern v. TXO Prod. Corp., 738 F.2d
968, 971 (8th Cir. 1984)).
176. Id. at 1583.
177. See id.
178. 933 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1991).
179. Id. at 591.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 591-92.
182. Id. at 597.
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deter asylum applicants from pursuing their statutory right to
appellate review of BIA asylum determinations." '183 The court
disagreed, however, and noted that "8 C.F.R. § 244.2... vests the
district director with 'sole jurisdiction' to reinstate or extend a grant of
voluntary departure.' 184
However, the court explained that it was "nevertheless concerned
that the INS might use its power to grant or withhold voluntary
departure to insulate the BIA's asylum decisions from judicial
review." '185 The court further explained that "[d]eportable aliens
should not be faced with the choice between enjoying the voluntary
departure privilege and securing judicial review of Board
determinations., 186 In addition, the court noted that if it came to its
"attention that the INS is wielding its discretion to withhold voluntary
departure to deter applicants from seeking judicial review of BIA
decisions, [its] scrutiny of that discretionary exercise might expand."' 87
iii. Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit, in Nkacoang v. INS,'88 similarly found that
Congress has not empowered the courts of appeals to reinstate
voluntary departure orders that have expired. 189  Adopting the
reasoning of the Tenth Circuit in Castaneda, the court held that absent
explicit congressional empowerment, an appellate court lacks the
jurisdictional authority to extend or reinstate voluntary departure.19 °
b. Decisions Post-IIRIRA
Upon the ratification of IIRIRA in 1996, the approach of the circuit
courts in reinstatement cases dramatically changed. The Third,191
Sixth, 92 and Ninth 93 Circuits have held that Congress has not
provided statutory authority for appellate courts to reinstate the
voluntary departure period prescribed by an IJ or the BIA, and
therefore these courts lack jurisdiction to reinstate an alien's
voluntary departure period. These circuit courts grounded their
decisions in the language of the INA as amended by IIRIRA. 194
183. Id.
184. Id. at 598.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. 83 F.3d 353 (11th Cir. 1996).
189. Id. at 357.
190. Id.
191. See Reynoso-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2004).
192. See Mullai v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 2004).
193. See Zazueta-Carrillo v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2003).
194. See, e.g., Reynoso-Lopez, 369 F.3d at 280-81.
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i. Ninth Circuit
For example, before Congress enacted IIRIRA, the Ninth Circuit,
in Contreras-Aragon v. INS,195 held that once voluntary departure is
granted by the BIA that privilege automatically "remains in effect
throughout the period of our review and for whatever additional
period the BIA afforded the alien in the order under review. "196
Under Contreras-Aragon, as long as the Board's decision was affirmed
without qualification, the voluntary departure period ran from the
date the court issued its determination. 197
However, in Zazueta-Carrillo v. Ashcroft' 98, the Ninth Circuit noted
that IIRIRA undermined the court's decision in Contreras-Aragon.
In re-examining the question, the court held that due to the statutory
changes, the voluntary departure period begins when BIA enters its
order granting the voluntary departure, and the court lacks the power
to reinstate the departure period upon the conclusion of its review.' 99
ii. Third Circuit
The court in Reynoso-Lopez v. Ashcroft explained that under the
plain language of IIRIRA, "the authority to reinstate or extend
voluntary departure falls solely within the discretion of the Attorney
General and his delegates at the INS."2"
The court then quoted the statute:
Authority to extend the time within which to depart voluntarily
specified initially by an immigration judge or the Board is only
within the jurisdiction of the district director, the Deputy Executive
Associate Commissioner for Detention and Removal, or the
Director of the Office of Juvenile Affairs. An immigration judge or
the Board may reinstate voluntary departure in a removal
proceeding that has been reopened for a purpose other than solely
making an application for voluntary departure if reopening was
granted prior to the expiration of the original period of voluntary
departure.20 1
Therefore, the court in Reynoso-Lopez explained, "the executive
branch, not the judiciary, is given the sole authority to determine
when an alien must depart. '2  The court also noted that "in granting
195. 852 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1988).
196. Id. at 1092.
197. Id. at 1092-93
198. 322 F.3d at 1170.
199. Id. at 1172-73.
200. Reynoso-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 369 F.3d 275, 280 (3rd Cir. 2004).
201. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(f) (2004)).
202. Id.
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the authority to set voluntary departure dates to the executive branch,
it is fair to say that Congress intended the authority to be exclusive.,
23
In addition, the court argued that "IIRIRA specifically limits the
role of the courts as to when an alien, under an order of voluntary
departure, must leave the country. '' 21 The statute provides that "'no
court shall have jurisdiction to review.., any judgment regarding the
granting of relief' under section 1229c. '' 2°5 The court reasoned that,
although this provision does not deny the court jurisdiction in the
present case, since Reynoso is not appealing a denial of a request for
voluntary departure, the provisions indicate Congress's intent to "vest
the right to set deadlines for an alien's voluntary departure solely
within the executive branch. ' '2°  The other circuits that have
addressed this issue have used the same analysis.2 °7
Furthermore, the court in Reynoso-Lopez argued that the court's
lack of ability to grant the reinstatement "does not leave [the alien]
without remedy., 208 The Reynoso-Lopez court reasoned that under
IIRIRA, the alien "may apply for a reinstatement or extension of
voluntary departure directly to the district director., 29 In addition,
the court explained that a statement by the BIA informing Reynoso
that any extension of the voluntary departure time period may be
granted by the district director indicates that the "BIA has interpreted
the INA as giving the district director the sole authority to set and
203. Id. at 281.
204. Id.
205. Id. (omission in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) (2000)).
206. Id.
207. See, e.g., Mullai v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 635, 640 (6th Cir. 2004). The Sixth
Circuit used the language of IIRIRA to explain its refusal to reinstate departure
periods and noted that its decision is consistent with the approach of the majority of
the courts following the enactment of IIRIRA. Id. The court explained that "[a]ny
judicial order to 'reinstate' the departure period "would necessarily authorize a new
opportunity to voluntarily depart." Id. Therefore, the court reasoned that, since it
offered a new opportunity for voluntary departure, the Attorney General's office had
the sole authority to make this determination under the Act. Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1229c.
In addition, the court noted that this function is explicitly denied to the courts by 8
U.S.C. § 1229c(f) and § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), which preclude judicial review of any
judgment regarding voluntary departure. Mullai, 383 F.3d at 640. Under 8 U.S.C. §
1229c(f), "[nlo court shall have jurisdiction over an appeal from denial of a request
for an order of voluntary departure under subsection (b) of this section, nor shall any
court order a stay of an alien's removal pending consideration of any claim with
respect to voluntary departure." 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(f). Additionally, 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(B) provides that "no court shall have jurisdiction to review... (i) any
judgment regarding the granting of relief under... [8 U.S.C.] section 1229c [voluntary
departure]." Id. § 1252(a)(2)(B).
208. Reynoso-Lopez, 369 F.3d at 281; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1244.2(f)(2) (2004)
(allowing an alien to be granted Temporary Protected Status in certain
circumstances); Castaneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576, 1582 (10th Cir. 1994). The court in
Reynoso-Lopez explained that "[s]eeking relief from the district director is ... the
procedure that Congress intended for a petitioner... to follow." Reynoso-Lopez, 369
F.3d at 281.
209. Reynoso-Lopez, 369 F.3d at 283; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1244.2(f)(2).
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extend the departure periods. 22 ° Therefore, the court reasoned that
even if the statutory language is unclear, the court would still be
required to "give deference to the BIA's interpretation of IIRIRA.
2 1
'
In addition, the court explained that "under IIRIRA, the appellate
courts retain jurisdiction to review an alien's appeal after he
voluntarily departs. '2 12 This remedy did not exist prior to the passage
of IIRIRA because "under the former INA, an appellate court lost
jurisdiction once a petitioner left the country. '213  Thus, the court
argued that IIRIRA eliminates the problem of forcing an alien to
choose between seeking judicial review and "taking advantage of
voluntary departure. 214
The court further examined the policy considerations that support
the "conclusion that Congress did not intend for appellate courts to
have authority to extend voluntary departure orders. 2 15 The court
noted that the purpose of granting voluntary departure in place of
deportation is to encourage the alien's punctual departure from the
country "without further trouble" to the government. 16 Therefore, if
extensions are granted by the appellate courts, it does not encourage
prompt departure, and in fact may "even encourage frivolous appeals
in an attempt to continue extending an alien's departure date. '217
3. Analysis of the Circuit Split that Has Emerged Concerning the
Courts' Authority to Reinstate Departure Periods
Due to the varying interpretations of the right of an alien to judicial
review and voluntary departure, and the meaning of the statutory
provisions governing voluntary departure as amended by IIRIRA, the
circuits are divided on the issue of whether they have the power to
reinstate departure periods following judicial review.
210. Reynoso-Lopez, 369 F.3d at 283.
211. Id. at 281. The Court, in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense
Council, Inc., held that:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the
statute by regulation.... Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency
on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a
court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984);
see also Zazueta-Carrillo v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 1166, 1173 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining
that the INA either confirms the BIA's position that an executive officer must set the
departure period, or is unclear and that, "if the statute is unclear, then the BIA's
position is entitled to Chevron deference," as a basic principle of administrative law).
212. Reynoso-Lopez, 369 F.3d at 281; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(B).
213. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (1994) (repealed 1996).
214. Reynoso-Lopez, 369 F.3d at 281; see also Zazueta-Carrillo, 322 F.3d at 1171.
215. Reynoso-Lopez, 369 F.3d at 283.
216. Id.; see also Zazueta-Carrillo, 322 F.3d at 1173.
217. Reynoso-Lopez, 369 F.3d at 284.
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a. Choice Between Voluntary Departure and Judicial Review
Both the First and the Fourth Circuits expressed concern that an
alien would be forced to choose between exercising his right to appeal
and taking advantage of voluntary departure.218 The Third Circuit in
Reynoso-Lopez explained, however, that the "Fourth Circuit's
concern that the INS may use its discretion over voluntary departure
in order to deter judicial review of BIA decisions was eliminated by
IIRIRA's provision that appellate courts retain jurisdiction over an
alien's appeal after he has departed the country." 219 In this way, the
Third Circuit argued that the alien is no longer faced with the choice
of departing voluntarily or pursuing judicial review because the alien
is able to depart and then continue his appeal in the circuit court from
abroad.22°
However, various courts have responded to this assertion by
explaining that "[w]hile aliens in these situations may formally retain
their right to appeal under the post-IIRIRA statute after leaving this
country, their purpose in seeking an appeal is arguably thwarted.
221
The courts that have expressed this viewpoint assert the concern that
aliens, especially in asylum cases, who voluntarily depart may be
"returning to home countries where they are unsafe or, even if safe,
will not be allowed to return to the United States should they be
successful on judicial review. "222
b. Statutory Provisions
In addition, the First and Fourth Circuits have argued that there is
no reason for an appellate court not to reinstate the initial departure
period granted by the IJ or the BIA where the INS had offered no
evidence to suggest that the alien had become ineligible for voluntary
departure during the course of the appeal.223  The Third Circuit
argued, however, that this approach "conflicts with the specific
procedures provided for in the statute. ' 224  The Third Circuit
explained that the INA is clear that a reinstatement or extension of
the voluntary departure period may only be sought from the district
director.225 The court relied on 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(f), which provides
218. See supra Part II.A.1.
219. Reynoso-Lopez, 369 F.3d at 283.
220. See id.
221. Khalil v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 176, 181 (1st Cir. 2004); see also Zazueta-Carrillo,
322 F.3d at 1177 (Berzon, J., concurring) (noting that "[a]n alien's departure in these
circumstances could in effect void the asylum appeal").
222. Khalil, 370 F.3d at 181; see also Nwakanma v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 325, 327 (6th
Cir. 2003); Zazueta-Carrillo, 322 F.3d at 1177.
223. See Ramsay v. INS, 14 F.3d 206, 212 (4th Cir. 1994); Umanzor-Alvarado v.
INS, 896 F.2d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 1990).
224. Reynoso-Lopez, 369 F.3d at 283.
225. See supra Part II.A.2.b.ii.
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that "[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over an appeal from denial of a
request for an order of voluntary departure under subsection [b], 22 6
and 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(f), which states that "[a]uthority to extend the
time within which to depart voluntarily specified initially by an
immigration judge or the Board is only within the jurisdiction of the
district director."2 7 Alternatively, the First Circuit has argued that
the statute and regulation describe the authority of the Attorney
General, and not that of the courts.228
In addition to the concern of conflicting with the statute, the Third
Circuit has mirrored the reasoning adopted by the Tenth Circuit
before the enactment of IIRIRA and explained that the approach
adopted by the First and Fourth Circuits "misplaces the burden of
persuasion in a petition for extension of voluntary departure, as the
INS does not bear the burden of showing an alien to be ineligible for
voluntary departure. 2 29 Instead, the court argued that "'it is the alien
who bears the burden of proving statutory eligibility for this form of
relief and demonstrating that it is warranted. '' 2
3
B. Stays of Departure Periods
A circuit split has also emerged concerning whether a circuit court
may stay the period of voluntary departure pending the completion of
the judicial review of the appeal. Unlike a complete reinstatement of
the departure period, a stay allows the circuit court to stay the tolling
of the time for departure until the completion of judicial review.
After the stay expires, "the clock begins ticking again and the alien
has the balance of the days left in which to leave the country.
231
Therefore, when an alien seeks to stay a voluntary departure period,
he "seeks to ensure that if the voluntary departure period expires
before the court reaches a decision on the petition for review (which
226. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(f) (2000).
227. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26() (2004).
228. Id. § 1240.26 (labeling the regulation as "Voluntary departure-authority of
the Executive Office for Immigration Review"); Khalil v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 176, 181
(1st Cir. 2004) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)) (stating that the statutes "describe the
authority of the Attorney General, not that of the courts"). In addition, the Khalil
court argued that "[t]he provisions that describe the authority of the courts provide
instead that '[judicial review of a final order of removal... is governed only by
chapter 158 of Title 28.'" Khalil, 370 F.3d at 181 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1)). In
addition, the court explained that:
[Cjhapter 158 of Title 28 provides that "[tihe filing of the petition to review
does not of itself stay or suspend the operation of the order of the agency,
but the court of appeals in its discretion may restrain or suspend, in whole or
in part, the operation of the order pending the final hearing and
determination of the petition."
Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2349(b) (2000)).
229. Reynoso-Lopez, 369 F.3d at 283.
230. Id. (quoting Castaneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576, 1582 (10th Cir. 1994)).
231. Lopez-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 650, 652 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Desta v.
Ashcroft, 365 F.3d 741, 743-44 (9th Cir. 2004)).
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almost always occurs), []he still will be able to depart voluntarily if the
petition for review is denied. 232
Unlike the split that has emerged over the reinstatement of the
departure period, the analysis of the courts has not been significantly
effected by the passage of IIRIRA. The First Circuit, following the
reasoning established in Umanzor-Alvarado, has concluded that it has
the plenary authority to reinstate an expired departure period,233 and
thus aliens appearing before the First Circuit are able to request a
reinstatement of the departure period rather than simply a stay
pending judicial review. Alternatively, the Sixth,234 Eighth,235 Ninth,236
and most recently the Seventh Circuit,237 have held that federal judges
have the authority to pause the voluntary departure period until the
appeal is complete. In contrast, the Fourth Circuit is the only circuit
to hold that federal judges have no authority over voluntary departure
deadlines.238
1. The Fourth Circuit's Argument Against Circuit Courts' Power to
Stay Departure Period Pending Judicial Review
Similar to the Third Circuit's decision in Reynoso-Lopez,23 9 the
Fourth Circuit's opinion in Ngarurih v. Ashcrof2 4° focused on the
changes to the law made by IIRIRA and concluded that the circuit
court lacks the power to stay or reinstate the departure period.241
First, the court noted that the Act is "well known for restricting
judicial review of discretionary decisions in immigration matters. 242
232. Id. (citation omitted).
233. See supra Part II.A.1.a.; see also Khalil, 370 F.3d at 56; Velasquez v. Ashcroft,
342 F.3d 55, 59 (1st Cir. 2003); Umanzor-Alvarado v. INS, 896 F.2d 14, 16 (1st Cir.
1990).
234. Nwakanma v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 325, 327 (6th Cir. 2003).
235. Rife v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 606, 616 (8th Cir. 2004).
236. Desta, 365 F.3d at 748.
237. Lopez-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 2004).
238. Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182 (4th Cir. 2004). The Third Circuit,
however, has shown similar leanings in dicta. In Begum v. Ashcroft, the Third Circuit
explained in a footnote that because of its decision in Reynoso-Lopez, the petitioner's
request for a stay of the voluntary departure period must be denied. See Begum v.
Ashcroft, 104 Fed. Appx. 805, 806 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004). The court did not distinguish
between a stay and a reinstatement of the voluntary departure period, but the
language appears to cover both. See id. The court in Reynoso-Lopez did not,
however, "expressly address the case of a person who filed a timely motion for a stay,
in conjunction with a properly filed petition for judicial review, before the time to
depart had expired." Lopez-Chavez, 383 F.3d at 653-54.
239. See supra Part II.A.2.b.ii.
240. Ngarurih, 371 F.3d at 182.
241. Id. at 194.
242. Id. at 191; see also Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525
U.S. 471, 486 (1999) (observing that "many provisions of IIRIRA are aimed at
protecting the Executive's discretion from the courts-indeed, that can fairly be said
to be the theme of the legislation").
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In addition, the court explained that prior to IIRIRA, it was
"unsettled" whether the circuit courts had the power to reinstate or
stay voluntary departure; however, with the enactment of IIRIRA the
justifications for granting the circuit courts the authority to make
these decisions have been "undercut.
243
In addition, the court argued that the Act eliminated an important
rationale for judicial intervention in the voluntary departure
process. 2"4 As emphasized by the Third Circuit in Reynoso-Lopez,
before IIRIRA, aliens who departed from the country voluntarily
could not, as a matter of law, continue their appeals of agency
decisions.2 45  Therefore, the federal courts often issued stays of
voluntary departure lest asylum and other decisions of the INS escape
review entirely.246 However, IIRIRA replaced the provision which
had limited judicial review after an alien left the country2 47 with a
"new judicial review provision that does not purport to cut off
appellate jurisdiction once an alien leaves the country., 248  This
change allows an alien to continue his appeal from outside the
country, and "there is no longer any prospect that the government
could manipulate voluntary departure orders to deprive an alien of
judicial review. "249
In addition, the court explained that after the passage of IIRIRA "it
is no longer true that nothing in the law.., deprives [the court of
appeals] of the legal power to reinstate voluntary departure. '25 ' The
court argued, like the court in Reynoso-Lopez, that § 1229c(f), which
precludes review of a denial of a request for voluntary departure, and
§ 1252(a)(2)(B), which deprived courts of the ability to review "'any
judgment regarding the granting of relief under section... 1229c...
of this title,"' combined to deny the circuit courts the power to review
any aspect of the voluntary departure determination.25 1 The court
argued that this conclusion is "consistent with Congress' expressed
243. Ngarurih, 371 F.3d at 192.
244. See id. at 193.
245. Id.; see supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
246. See Umanzor-Alvarado v. INS, 896 F.2d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 1990); accord
Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588, 598 (7th Cir. 1991).
247. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (1994) (repealed 1996).
248. Ngarurih, 371 F.3d at 192; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2000); Moore v. Ashcroft,
251 F.3d 919, 922 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that "[n]oticeably absent from the
permanent rules is any similar language removing federal review jurisdiction in the
event an alien departs or is removed").
249. Ngarurih, 371 F.3d at 192; see also Zazueta-Carrillo v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 1166,
1171 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that "Congress's desire to expedite removal by
voluntary assent now does not conflict with the alien's ability to pursue a petition for
review"); Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216, 1217 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating that
"deportation no longer forecloses judicial review").
250. Ngarurih, 371 F. 3d at 193 (quoting Umanzor-Alvarado, 896 F.2d at 16).
251. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)).
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intention to preserve the exercise of executive discretion in granting
voluntary departures. 25 2
Mirroring the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Zazueta-Carrillo v.
INS,253 the court explained that under IIRIRA, the decision of
whether to grant an alien permission to depart voluntarily is
"committed entirely to the discretion of the Attorney General. ' 254 In
addition, the "Attorney General has permitted the INS district
director.., to extend the period initially prescribed for voluntary
departure. ' 25 5 Therefore, the court argued, "'it is the executive rather
than judicial officers who decide when an alien must depart,' and
'[n]either the statute nor the regulations give courts any designated
role in this process of setting the deadline for departure.' 25 6 Thus, the
court concluded that it could not stay, or reinstate, voluntary
departure orders because it lacked the jurisdictional authority to do
SO.
25 7
In addition, the court argued that the "statutory scheme reveal[ed]
Congress' intention to offer an alien a specific benefit- exemption
from the ordinary bars on subsequent relief-in return for a quick
departure at no cost to the government.""2 8  Therefore, "an alien
considering voluntary departure must decide whether an exemption
from the ordinary bars on subsequent relief is worth the cost of
returning to the home country within the period specified. 259
2. The Majority View: A Circuit Court's Power to Stay Voluntary
Departure
The majority of courts that have addressed this issue, including
courts that have held that they lack the power to reinstate departure
periods, have held that they have the power to stay the departure
period while the case is under judicial review. The Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have held that courts have the authority to
stay voluntary departure orders stemming from their equitable
powers, when the stay is issued in order to maintain meaningful
judicial review, a power not affected by the provisions of IIRIRA.26 °
252. Id.
253. 322 F.3d at 1166.
254. Ngarurih, 371 F.3d at 193; see 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1).
255. Id.; see 8 C.F.R. § 240.26 (20004)
256. Ngarurih, 371 F.3d at 193 (quoting Zazueta-Carrillo, 322 F.3d at 1172).
257. Id. at 195.
258. Id. at 194.
259. Id.
260. See Lopez-Chavez v. Aschroft, 383 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2004); Rife v. Ashcroft,
374 F.3d 606 (8th Cir. 2004); Desta v. Ashcroft, 365 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2004);
Nwakanma v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2003).
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a. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit, in Desta v. Ashcroft, explained that "IIRIRA
does not specify the circumstances in which we may issue a stay of
voluntary departure, and therefore does not act as a bar to the use of
our equitable powers." '61  Although the court acknowledged that
IIRIRA deprives courts of jurisdiction to review the decision by the
BIA to grant or deny a request for voluntary departure, the court
stated that whether a court has the power to grant a stay of the
departure period while reviewing an alien's claim presents a different
issue. 62 The court explained that in these cases "we are being asked
to stop the voluntary departure clock from running while we consider
[the petitioner's] petition for review, and to allow it to resume after
we decide the merits of that petition., 263
In addition, the court explained that in a determination of the
extent of the court's authority to grant stays under IIRIRA, it must be
guided by two principles. 214 First, the court stated that the sections of
IIRIRA which limit judicial review and the exercise of the courts'
traditional equitable powers should be narrowly construed.265
Furthermore, the court observed that, in interpreting IIRIRA, courts
should seek to avoid an interpretation that would lead to an "absurd
result, such as the expenditure of unnecessary judicial resources or
overly severe consequences toward aliens., 266
The court then addressed the severe consequences that may face an
alien who is forced to depart from the United States before being
given the opportunity for judicial review.267 As explained by Judge
Marsha Berzon in his concurrence in Zazueta-Carrillo v. Ashcroft,268
and later adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Desta, aliens who are forced
to depart before their appeal is heard may not be able to return to the
261. Desta, 365 F.3d at 747.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 746.
265. Id.; see also Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 340-41 (2000) (admonishing that
"we should not construe a statute to displace courts' traditional equitable authority
absent the 'clearest command,' or an 'inescapable inference' to the contrary"
(citations omitted)); Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253 F.3d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc)
(discussing the court's ability to stay removals notwithstanding IIRIRA's prohibition
on federal courts granting class-wide injunctive relief and citing Reno v. American-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1999)).
266. Desta, 365 F.3d at 746.
267. See id. Each court that has determined that the "courts retain their equitable
power to stay voluntary departure" periods while pending judicial review has
examined the consequences that may face an alien who departs while his appeal is
pending. See, e.g., Lopez-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 350, 653 (7th Cir. 2004); Rife v.
Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 606, 615 (8th Cir. 2004); Nwakanma v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 325, 327
(6th Cir. 2003).
268. 322 F.3d 1166, 1173 (9th Cir. 2003).
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United States, thereby rendering their appeal worthless. 269  Judge
Berzon explained that without the courts' "equitable authority to stay
the availability of voluntary departure periods, at the time an alien is
granted voluntary departure he or she would be faced with having to
leave forthwith to preserve the benefits of voluntary departure,
risking nonreturn in spite of a potentially meritorious case. "270 This
choice may be particularly difficult for an alien seeking asylum who
''would have to weigh the dangers of abuse in and/or confinement to
the country in which the alien was allegedly persecuted against the
penalties attached to forfeiting a grant of voluntary departure.,
271
Therefore, if an alien does depart in the prescribed period, and
chooses to exercise his right to appeal from abroad, he might not be
able to return to the United States if the petition for relief is
successful, thereby effectively voiding the asylum appeal.272
The Ninth Circuit also noted that courts need not extend the period
for voluntary departure in contravention of INS regulations.273
Rather, the court noted that, unlike a reinstatement, "if a stay is
granted, the total time period for voluntary departure remains the
same as that granted by the BIA., 274 Therefore, although the court is
"stopping the clock from running," it is not "adding more time to that
269. See Desta, 365 F.3d at 746; Zazueta-Carillo, 322 F.3d at 1173.
270. See Zazueta-Carrillo, 322 F.3d at 1177 (Berzon, J., concurring).
271. Id.
272. Id.; see also Lopez-Chavez, 383 F.3d at 651. The Lopez-Chavez court noted
that
aliens who are granted voluntary departure face a difficult choice: either
follow the rules, depart voluntarily, and obtain a few benefits, at the price of
serious or fatal difficulty in pursuing relief and exposure to intolerable
conditions in the country of destination; or break the rules by failing to
leave, accept the penalties associated with that failure, and continue to press
any appeals.
Id.; see also Rife, 374 F.3d at 615 (explaining that an alien who has brought an
asylum claim, and is forced to depart before the appeal has been heard may
"suffer the very persecution [that is] being litigated"); Ngarurih v. Ashcroft,
371 F.3d 182, 196 (4th Cir. 2004) (Gregory, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (explaining that if the alien suffers the harm of "death,
imprisonment, or inability to depart their native country" after voluntarily
departing the United States, a subsequent opinion by the circuit court
granting him asylum would be rendered meaningless because the alien would
be unable to return to the U.S. to give effect to the court's decision). In
Nwakanma the court stated as follows:
Asylum applicants with potentially meritorious cases establishing their
genuine fear of persecution in their home countries will face either returning
to those countries and possibly life-threatening persecution or staying in the
United States, letting the clock run out on their voluntary departure periods,
and suffering the penalties that attach
Nwakanma, 352 F.3d at 327.
273. Desta, 365 F.3d at 746; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(f) (2004) (stating that the
"[a]uthority to extend the time within which to depart voluntarily specified initially by
an immigration judge or the Board is only within the jurisdiction" of listed officials
within U.S. Immigration and Customs enforcement, or the former INS).
274. Desta, 365 F.3d at 747.
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clock. ' 27' Thus, the court reasoned that there is no statutory bar on
the court's using its equitable powers to stay the departure period.276
b. Seventh Circuit
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit, in Lopez-Chavez v. Ashcroft,2 77
rejected the arguments raised by the Fourth Circuit in Ngarurih,278 and
held, in agreement with the majority of the courts that have addressed
the issue, that federal courts "retain the equitable power to stay
voluntary departure orders, notwithstanding the restrictions that exist
under IIRIRA, when such an action is taken to preserve meaningful
judicial review. "279
The court in Lopez-Chavez noted that the cases that present issues
regarding stays of voluntary departure periods differ from the
aforementioned reinstatement cases.2 80  The court explained that it
had previously held that in reinstatement cases courts "lack[]
'authority' to reinstate.., a voluntary departure period after a
decision on a petition for review, because only the immigration service
possessed that discretion." '281 The court further noted that "[f]ull
reinstatement ... is very close in practical effect to an initial grant of
the privilege of voluntary departure, and thus those decisions merely
reflect an effort not to undermine the immigration service's authority
over initial grants. 282
Furthermore, the court in Lopez-Chavez explained that it is
"unclear" from the reinstatement cases which had been previously
heard before the Seventh Circuit whether the circuit "recogniz[ed] a
jurisdictional bar or merely a discretionary rule. ' 283  The court
cautioned that it might "reconsider [its] position should it appear that
the immigration service was using its discretion not to extend
275. Id.; see also El Himri v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1261, 1262 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding
that the district director's authority to extend voluntary departure does not limit the
court's equitable authority to grant a stay of the voluntary departure time period).
276. Desta, 365 F.3d at 748.
277. 383 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2004).
278. Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182 (7th Cir. 2004); see supra Part II.B.1.
279. Lopez-Chavez, 383 F.3d at 653.
280. See supra Part II.A.
281. Lopez-Chavez, 383 F.3d at 652; see Ademi v. INS, 31 F.3d 517, 521 (7th Cir.
1994); Zulbeari v. INS, 963 F.2d 999, 1001 (7th Cir. 1992); Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933
F.2d 588, 598 (7th Cir. 1991).
282. Lopez-Chavez, 383 F.3d at 652; see also Ngarurih, 371 F.3d at 197 (Gregory, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concurring in the majority's decision that
IIRIRA divests the court of jurisdiction to reinstate voluntary departure periods);
Garcia v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the court could
not grant the petitioner's request to extend his departure period because to do so
would contravene INS regulations).
283. Lopez-Chavez, 383 F.3d at 652.
2888 [Vol. 73
VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE
voluntary departure periods in an effort to deter aliens from seeking
judicial review of immigration decisions. "284
Thus, the court in Lopez-Chavez held that "in an appropriate case,
one that falls under the permanent IIRIRA rules and in which the
time for voluntary departure has not yet run, nothing in IIRIRA
divests us of the power to grant a stay tolling the time for departure
until the completion of judicial review. '' 281 The court reasoned that
aliens in "deserving cases" should be able to pursue judicial review
"without flouting their voluntary departure orders. '286
3. Comparison of the Circuit Courts' Approach to Stays of the
Voluntary Departure Period
Similar to the split over reinstatements of the departure periods, the
circuits are divided on the issue of whether courts have the authority
to grant stays of the voluntary departure period pending the
completion of judicial review. Due to contrasting interpretations of
the provisions of IIRIRA, and differing views of the policy rationales
underlying voluntary departure and judicial review of decisions by the
IJ and BIA, the circuits have split on this issue.
a. Statutory Language
The statutory provisions of IIRIRA clearly indicate that the courts
of appeals do not have jurisdiction over the immigration authorities'
initial decision to grant or deny the privilege of voluntary departure.287
The Fourth Circuit interpreted these provisions of IIRIRA as
284. Id.; see Ademi, 31 F.3d at 521 n.8 (stating that "to discourage the right to
appeal is to place an unconstitutional burden on the alien's right to due process");
Kaczmarczyk, 933 F.2d at 598 (emphasizing that the court may expand its review of
voluntary departure denials if the BIA began to exercise its discretion so as to
discourage applicants from seeking judicial review of BIA decisions). The court in
Lopez-Chavez also explained that, although it held that IIRIRA stripped the court of
jurisdiction to review the merits of the immigration service's decision with respect to
voluntary departure, this decision concerned only the possible review of a decision by
an immigration official who refused to extend a voluntary departure date. Lopez-
Chavez, 383 F.3d at 652. Thus, the court did not address the question of its power to
preserve "the status quo pending judicial review." Id.
285. Lopez-Chavez, 383 F.3d at 654.
286. Id. In order to be granted a stay of voluntary departure, an alien must satisfy
the requirements for a stay of removal. El Himri v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1261, 1262 (9th
Cir. 2003). For both motions, the standard is the same as that employed in
determining whether a litigant is entitled to injunctive relief. The petitioner must
show "(1) 'a probability of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable
injury,' or (2) 'that serious legal questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips
sharply in the petitioner's favor."' Id. (quoting Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th
Cir. 1998)); see also Ngarurih, 371 F.3d at 197 (Gregory, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in Part).
287. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(f) (2004) ("No court shall have jurisdiction over an
appeal from denial of a request for an order of voluntary departure.").
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divesting the circuit courts of the power to review any aspect of the
voluntary departure order.88 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit found
that "the question whether the date by which voluntary departure
must take place can be stayed to preserve the status quo pending
judicial review presents a different issue. 289
The circuits holding that courts have the equitable power to grant
stays of voluntary departure interpreted the language of IIRIRA
narrowly. These circuit courts have declared that 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(f)
should apply only to forbid courts from reviewing the merits of the
underlying decisions on a request for voluntary departure. 290 These
courts agree that the provisions restricting the jurisdiction of the
federal courts are "best read to restrict judicial review of only the
initial decision to grant or deny voluntary departure. ' 291 Therefore,
these circuits have viewed the substantive issues regarding voluntary
departure as separate and distinct from the question of whether it is
within the power of the circuit court to stay a voluntary departure
period once the immigration authorities have chosen to grant the
relief.29  In addition, the courts have explained that, if a stay is
granted, the total time period for voluntary departure remains the
same, and therefore the courts are not extending the departure period
in contravention of 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(f). 293
b. Choice of Voluntary Departure or Judicial Review
In addition to the conflict regarding the interpretation of the
statute, Judge Roger Gregory explained in Ngarurih that
[a]s the Ninth and Sixth Circuits have noted, asylum appeals will in
effect be rendered meaningless if individuals that have fled their
native lands based on well-founded fears of persecution are forced
to return to countries where they may be killed or imprisoned and
288. See supra Part II.A.L.b.
289. Lopez-Chavez, 383 F.3d at 651; see supra Part II.B.2.
290. See, e.g., Lopez-Chavez, 383 F.3d at 652; Desta v. Ashcroft, 365 F.3d 741, 747
(9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that lIRIRA deprives a circuit court of the power to
review the decision by the BIA to grant or deny a request for voluntary departure
under 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(f), but does not speak to the question of whether a circuit
court may issue a stay of voluntary departure); Nwakanma v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 325,
327 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that "in granting a stay of voluntary departure, we do not
pass on the substance of the decision to grant voluntary departure; we only stay the
immediate effectiveness of the relief already granted by respondent in his discretion,
to allow the alien petitioner to receive appellate review").
291. Lopez-Chavez, 383 F.3d at 653.
292. Id.
293. See, e.g., Desta, 365 F.3d at 747; see also supra notes 274-76 and accompanying
text.
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thus unable to return to the United States if we determine that they
are entitled to asylum.24
The Fourth Circuit, however, responded to Gregory's view
explaining that "[t]his is not so much an objection to review
procedures concerning voluntary departure as it is an objection to the
procedures for appellate review of immigration cases generally."2 9
The court also declared as follows:
[A]n alien considering voluntary departure must decide whether an
exemption from the ordinary bars on subsequent relief is worth the
cost of returning to the home country within the period specified.
Having made his election, however, the alien takes all the benefits
and all the burdens of the statute together.96
III. RESOLVING UNCERTAINTY: THE NEED FOR A UNIFORM
APPLICATION OF THE COURT'S AUTHORITY TO REINSTATE OR STAY
DEPARTURE PERIODS
Part II examined the various approaches and rationales adopted by
the circuit courts on the question of reinstatements and stays of
voluntary departure. This part argues that these divergences warrant
a determination by the Supreme Court resolving the existing split.
This part contends that, although IIRIRA precludes the circuit courts
from reinstating the departure period, it does not detract from the
courts' equitable powers, and, therefore, the circuit courts retain the
authority to grant stays while judicial review is pending.
A. Resolution of Circuit Split
As the law currently stands, the geographic area in which an alien
resides may have a large impact on his decision to apply for and
accept voluntary departure as a relief.297 Even upon acceptance of
voluntary departure, an alien may be forced to choose between
294. Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 198 (4th Cir. 2004) (Gregory, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted); see also Nwakanma, 352
F.3d at 327 (observing that asylum applicants are faced with the choice of either
returning to countries where they may face persecution or staying in the United States
and suffering the consequences attached to staying beyond their departure periods).
295. Ngarurih, 371 F.3d at 194. The Ngarurih court further stated as follows:
Absent a stay of removal, an alien in an ordinary immigration appeal may be
removed to his home country even before his appeal is decided. Even in
that case, there is a possibility that the alien will face persecution in the
home country rendering him unable to return should he prevail on appeal.
The remedy for this concern is the stay of removal, which we retain the
option to grant in any case where the alien satisfies the statutory
requirements. This relief is just as available to the alien who sought
voluntary departure as it is to the alien who did not.
Id.
296. Id.
297. See supra Part II.
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departing by the specified date or appealing for judicial review.298
Therefore, in order to lend uniformity to this area of the law, and
resolve the circuit split, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to
hear the issue.
The Supreme Court should honor the language of IIRIRA, and
thus follow the reasoning established by the circuit courts that have
held that the courts lack the power to grant reinstatements of the
voluntary departure periods pending judicial review of a denial of a
request for asylum or other forms of permanent relief. 99 However,
the Court should hold that the circuit courts retain the ability to stay
departure periods pending judicial review due to their equitable
powers. 00
Unlike a stay, when a court reinstates the departure period, the
court, in practical effect, takes an action virtually identical to the
initial grant of the privilege of voluntary departure.3"1 As explicitly
stated in IIRIRA, however, this function is assigned to the Attorney
General's office by 8 U.S.C. § 1229c,3"2 and denied to the courts by §
1252(a)(2)(B)(i). °3
Furthermore, courts do not have the authority to extend the
departure period." The Act states as follows:
Authority to extend the time within which to depart voluntarily
specified initially by an immigration judge or the Board is only
within the jurisdiction of the district director, the Deputy Executive
Associate Commissioner for Detention and Removal, or the
Director of the Office of Juvenile Affairs.
30 5
Therefore, under IIRIRA, courts lack the authority to reinstate the
voluntary departure periods set by the IJ or BIA, and the Supreme
Court's decision should reflect this statutory prohibition.
B. Circuit Courts Have the Authority to Stay the Departure Period
Pending Judicial Review
Due to the busy dockets of each circuit court, and the small time
period normally granted for voluntary departures, the courts' lack of
power to grant reinstatements has a negative effect. Lack of judicial
power in this area allows immigration officials to pressure those facing
voluntary departure to bypass a judicial review of their claim because
of the consequences of remaining in the country past their departure
298. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
299. See supra Part II.A.3.
300. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
301. Lopez-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 650, 652 (7th Cir. 2004); see supra notes
281-83 and accompanying text.
302. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(f) (2000).
303. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); supra Part II.A.3.b.
304. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(f) (2004).
305. Id. (emphasis added).
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period.3"6 As the Seventh Circuit explained, "[d]eportable aliens
should not be faced with the choice between enjoying the voluntary
departure privilege and securing judicial review of Board
determinations.""3 7  Although the Third Circuit argues that this
problem is remedied because the alien may now have his claim
reviewed by the federal court after he voluntarily departs from the
country,30 8 this "analysis underestimates the difficulty that aliens will
likely encounter in pursuing appeals from afar and the possibility that
they will be subjected to the persecution that they are trying to avoid
before relief on appeal may be granted.
309
This argument becomes particularly troubling when viewed in the
context of asylum cases. Aliens seeking asylum must show that they
are unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin "'because
of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.""'31 Therefore, if an alien is forced to depart before
his appeal is heard by a circuit court, he may be subject to the very
persecution at issue in the litigation.3 ' Although the Fourth Circuit
argued that this is part of the choice an alien must make when
accepting voluntary departure,31 the court failed to address the effect
that this would have on the court's decision itself. If the persecution
comes "in the form of death, imprisonment, or the inability to depart
from [an alien's] native country, [a court's] determination that the
alien is entitled to asylum is meaningless because the alien will be
unable to return [to] the United States to give effect to the decision.313
If, however, an alien chooses to have his appeal heard before the
circuit court, and, as in almost every case, the appeal is not heard until
after the departure period granted by the IJ or BIA, the alien will be
subject to considerable penalties and will lose the benefits of
voluntary departure.3" 4 Failure to depart voluntarily may force the
alien to incur penalties such as the relinquishment of any posted bond,
a fine between $1000 and $5000, and ineligibility for a period of ten
years for various forms of immigration relief.315
With these concerns in mind, some federal courts have sought a
solution to the problems presented by the courts' inability to reinstate
306. See supra Part II.B.
307. Kaczmarczyk v. INS, 933 F.2d 588, 598 (7th Cir. 1991); see supra Part
II.A.2.a.ii.
308. See supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
309. Lopez-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 650, 653 (7th Cir. 2004).
310. Melkonian v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42)(A) (2000)); see supra Part I.A.4.b.i.
311. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
312. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
313. See Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 196 (4th Cir. 2004) (Gregory, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); supra Part II.B.2.b.
314. See supra Part I.E.3.
315. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d).
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departure periods as set forth in IIRIRA. These courts have looked
to their equitable and-injunctive powers to stay pending matters, and
thereby "avoided colliding with the IIRIRA constraints on courts'
jurisdiction., 316
The courts that have found that they lack the authority to issue
stays of voluntary departure have read this bar into the text of
IIRIRA. They read the provisions limiting courts from hearing an
appeal from a denial of a request for an order of voluntary departure
and courts' ability to grant extensions of the departure period as an
indication that Congress intended to leave all decisions regarding
voluntary departure to the discretion of the executive branch.317
As the Supreme Court explained, however, statutes should not be
construed to displace the traditional equitable powers of the courts
absent the "clearest command" or "inescapable inference" to the
contrary.318  Since IIRIRA does not present a clear command
divesting the courts of their traditional equitable powers, it should not
be viewed as limiting these powers. 9 The language of IIRIRA does
not specify when a court may or may not use its equitable powers to
stay the departure period. Therefore, the statute cannot be viewed as
a bar on the use of equitable powers to stay voluntary departure.320
Furthermore, as argued by the Ninth Circuit, the act of granting a
stay does not violate any of the provisions of IIRIRA referred to in
the reinstatement cases.32' First, by allowing a stay on the voluntary
departure period, courts are not reviewing the decision of the BIA to
grant or deny a request for voluntary departure.322 To the contrary, an
alien requesting a stay has already been granted the relief of voluntary
departure twice: once by an IJ and then again by the BIA.323 In these
cases, the court is simply being asked to stop the departure period
from running while the alien's petition for review is considered, and
then to allow the period to resume after the merits of the petition are
decided.324 It is not being asked to extend the departure period, in
contravention of 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(f). Rather, the total time of the
departure period remains the same as that set by the BIA.325
Most importantly, a court's ability to stay the departure period
pending its review of the alien's petition removes the problem
inherent in forcing an alien to choose between the benefits of
316. Mullai v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 635, 640 (6th Cir. 2004).
317. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
318. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 340-41 (2000) (citations omitted); see supra
note 266 and accompanying text.
319. See supra Part II.B.3.a.
320. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
321. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
322. See supra notes 292-95 and accompanying text.
323. See supra Part I.A.5.
324. See supra Part II.B.
325. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
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voluntary departure and his or her statutory right to judicial review of
his or her claim.326 Not only does the choice cause possible irreparable
harm to aliens, it also threatens to render the decisions of the circuit
courts in asylum cases meaningless." 7
Although it can be argued that an alien who chooses the benefits of
the relief of voluntary departure must also accept the burden of losing
the opportunity for judicial review, this is a policy determination best
left to Congress, which has not explicitly addressed this issue.328 Thus,
absent clear statutory language, which is not found in IIRIRA, aliens
with possibly meritorious appeals should not be forced to choose
between preserving certain benefits lawfully granted to them under
the INA and their own personal safety.3 29 Therefore, upon the
granting of certiorari to decide this issue, the Supreme Court should
hold that IIRIRA does not limit the equitable powers of the circuit
courts to stay departure periods while judicial review of the alien's
petition is pending.
326. Cf supra notes 274-77 and accompanying text.
327. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
328. See Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 194, 198 (4th Cir. 2004) (Gregory, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
329. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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